OP017 FCTC ARTICLE 5.3 & GOOD GOVERNANCE/ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES: HOW TO ACCELERATE ARTICLE 5.3 IMPLEMENTATION

John Stewart, Cloe Franko. Corporate Accountability International, United States
Background: Big Tobacco' s future hinges on its ability to interfere in public health laws. The world' s first public health and corporate accountability treaty, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), includes a critical provision, Article 5.3, which states the tobacco industry has an irreconcilable conflict of interest with public health. Article 5.3 is already paying dividends for public health. However, its incorporation into national legislation has been slower than other FCTC articles, in part because Article 5.3 is a good governance measure that limits corporate interference in policymaking. The tobacco control movement has spent decades devising a good governance framework for tobacco products to regulate the industry and protect public health policies from commercial interests. The tobacco industry has a long history of corrupt conduct. Corruption in the context of tobacco control ranges the gamut of tobacco industry interference tactics fueling fraudulent conduct by those in power. Objective: 1. Encourage policymakers and advocates to accelerate implementation of Article 5.3 into national legislation. 2. Make the case that Article 5.3 and its guidelines can be considered anticorruption measures and that this comparison can be a powerful tool for advocacy and to accelerate enforcement. 3. Share successful case studies and ideas for how to mobilize the anticorruption and transparency community. Method: Survey of policymakers, tobacco control, transparency and anticorruption organizations, research of case studies of tobacco industry interference that have used anti-corruption laws to challenge the industry and policymakers that have violated Article 5.3 and research of existing anticorruption law and how it compares to Article 5.3 and its guidelines. Result: Because the tobacco industry has a history of fomenting corrupt practices among policymakers, insulating public policymaking from tobacco industry interference and increasing transparency is, in actually, an anti-corruption measure. This is precisely what Article 5.3 aims to do. Article 5.3 and its guidelines can be incorporated into existing anti-corruption measures like codes of conduct or enforcement mechanisms. Conclusion: National anti-corruption laws present an opportunity to strengthen the implementation and enforcement of Article 5.3 provisions. Anti-corruption laws apply broadly to government officials across agencies to further public health policy.
OP035 TOBACCO INDUSTRY DIVERSIFICATION IN AFRICA: STRATEGIES, ACTIVITIES AND IMPLICATIONS
Mohamed Ould Sidi Mohamed, Kellen Nyamurung, Possy Mugyenyi. WHOCenter for Tobacco Control (CTCA), Uganda Background: Center for Tobacco Control (CTCA) has prepared this study on tobacco industry (TI) for governments and other TC stakeholders in Africa to provide a snapshot of the TI behavior in terms of common activities and tactics, TI market share and progress on implementation of Article 5.3 of FCTC. Furthermore, this report provides a comparison of TI actions and makes recommendations on how to counter the TI Interference in the region. The presentation gives the synthesis of findings from twelve (12) WHO-AFRO country data collected using the TIM tool developed by CTCA. The main objective of this study is to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the presence of the Tobacco Industry (TI) and its operations in Africa. Objective: The objectives of this presentation 1. Identify the tobacco industry interference in AFRO region 2. Determine tobacco industries marketing strategies in Africa 3. Determine the range and target of industry activities and tactics 4. Identify corporate social responsibilities activities 5. Identify tobacco industries front groups Method: The study used data from 12 countries using a semi-structured questionnaire based on the WHO-FCTC Article 5.3 and guideline. Specifically the data collection tool focused on interference on legislation, tobacco production, market share, and new tactics of the TI including TAPS, CSR, philanthropy, alliances and front groups. The data collection took place from September 2012 to March 2013 and analysis focused on twelve countries and in the Africa region. 
OP038 ENDGAME FOR MENTHOL AND SLIM CIGARETTES IN EUROPE? POLAND -THE LAST HURDLE
Mateusz Zygmunt Zatonski. Health Promotion Foundation, Poland
Background: In internal tobacco industry documents, menthol and "slim" cigarettes appear as key products for enticing teenagers into smoking, and in Japan, Finland, or Poland account for over 1/5 of the tobacco market share. In December 2012 the EU Commission proposed to update the Tobacco Products Directive, including a ban on the sale of flavoured and "slim" cigarettes (FaSCs) in the EU. While the majority of EU countries support this proposal, the Polish Ministry of Agriculture, urged by Polish tobacco growers and many MPs, has called the government to block the update. Objective: 1) Identify the key stakeholders among the Polish and EU bodies involved in the discussion over the sale of FaSCs since December 2012. 2) Classify their position, and assess their relative impact on the eventual outcome of the debate. Method: Qualitative analysis and synthesis of primary and secondary sources released by the EU during the update' s formulation, and of sources documenting the attitudes towards this proposal, e.g. EU Commission update proposal and impact assessment, Eurobarometer survey on Europeans attitudes towards tobacco (May 2012), Euromonitor tobacco in Poland report (September 2012) , and documents analysing the impact of the update on Poland released by tobacco companies, the pro-tobacco lobby, the anti-tobacco lobby, Polish governmental agencies, and the reception of the update in the Polish parliament and media. Result: Eight principal stakeholders were identified that could be grouped as: public opinion (Polish citizens, media), lobbyists (pro-tobacco and pro-health groups), political bodies (EU Commission, Polish Health Ministry, Polish Agri-
